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## INNOVATION AND CONTINUITY IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

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ISSUES OF THEORY, METHODOLOGY AND PRACTICE  
OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

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- Халқаро тадқиқотларнинг назарий, услубий ва амалий масалалари ■
- Вопросы теории, методологии и практики международных исследований ■

**Gregory Gleason**

## Innovation and Continuity in American Foreign Policy

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The first principle of foreign policy is simple and straightforward. The goal of foreign policy is to act so as to succeed in the pursuit of the country's interest. Stating this goal is easy. But achieving this goal in practice is often not so straightforward and simple. Achieving a country's interest, any country's interest, may require complicated actions taken in complex situations fraught with uncertainty about the outcomes and, sometimes, confronting the possibility or even the reality that others may not share the same goals and may seek to block or undermine the actions. So achieving a country's interest may require actions artfully accomplished to avert risks and thwart challenges. At the same time, action may require balancing, positioning and leveraging while reaching beyond the easily attainable in order to grasp opportunities, whether they arise as a result of dedicated work or whether they simply emerge as a coincidence, a consequence of Fortuna.

Foreign policy is a sphere of politics, but it differs in important ways from domestic politics. Domestic policies are focused on a state's internal dimensions and may be influenced by foreign factors such as trade or security concerns. But the focus of domestic policy remains on the state's internal conditions. In contrast, foreign policy tends to be responsive to

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outside circumstances. In all states, in all times, in all circumstances foreign policy tends to be outward-looking. Foreign policy is keyed to the conditions and circumstances of the outside world. The attention of those involved in formulating and conducting foreign policy is for the most part oriented outward, focusing on the intentions and capabilities of neighbors, partners, and adversaries located beyond the border.

In thinking about foreign policy, it is useful to regard policy as a line of diplomatic action that can be analyzed as either *proactive* or *reactive*. Proactive policy implies the pursuit of objectives, leaning out in front of the actions of other parties and sometimes even sometimes coming into conflict with the policies of other parties, possibly before those parties have taken any steps at all. Reactive implies a response to a situation that has derived from an action taken by other parties or an action assumed to be at some point taken by other parties. A reactive policy may be either in furtherment of another party's action or it may be in opposition to another party's action. The distinction between proactive and reactive is usually apparent merely from the sequence of actions, with proactive steps being first in time. However, sometimes an action which appears to be first in time may be considered reactive because it is taken in expectation that some other party's action is imminent or is in the process of being planned or prepared. In other words, a preemptive action may be taken first in time so as to precede an anticipated action, but because it is a preemptive reaction, it is still essentially reactive.

While foreign policy always tends to be more reactive than domestic policy, there are variations which are a product of the state's relations with other state parties. All states have equal juridical status in terms of international law, but nevertheless states are not equivalent from the point of view of foreign policy capabilities. The great legal theorist Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) classically defined the system of political entities as states recognizing one another as independent, legitimate, sovereign and juridically equal states subject to principles of international law. Yet even to this day states have different portfolios and different resources, and thus are different in the ways they initiate actions and respond to actions initiated by other states or parties. This asymmetry among states leads to another important principle in practice: The degree to which a state is proactive in terms of foreign policy is proportional to the degree to which the state is influential in the international community. The more influential the state, the more its foreign policy tends to be proactive. Similarly, the less influential the state, the more its foreign policy tends to be reactive. A way of saying this in rough terms is that influential states tend to lead while smaller states tend to follow.

Perspicuity is the ability to see things accurately. Perspicuity is a foremost characteristic of the able diplomat. The more perceptive the diplomat and analyst at seeing things as they are, the more effective the diplomat and analyst will be at achieving analytical objectives. Sound foreign policy is based on incisive insight into circumstances, events and developments beyond a country's borders. Understanding the intentions and capabilities of others does not imply agreeing with them, but it does mean objectively assessing them. This is important because strategy, for any state in any set of circumstances, is conventionally defined as the ability to bring means into line with ends. States have capabilities (means) and ends (desires). A successful strategist is one who can, in the language of a celebrated aphorism, ensure that "desires always coincide with means."<sup>1</sup>

The immediate neighbors of Uzbekistan are of consequential interest to Uzbekistan in relation to their importance for commerce, security and human connections. Other neighbors, both those close at hand and those far away in terms of geography, are important to Uzbekistan in proportion to their role in the international community. The United States of America is a country of enduring importance to Uzbekistan given the role it has played in the past in the international community and given its promise for the future. The US is a state that should be understood realistically in terms of the attributes of its own foreign policy. The most recent decade has witnessed a great deal of discussion and debate about the purposes of American foreign policy. Because of its influence in the international community, the United States tends to be more proactive in its foreign policy than other states. But even a proactive state because of conditions in the international community may range between innovative and conventional policies.

The thesis of this article is that there are aspects of American foreign policy that are highly innovative and there are aspects that are highly traditional. Understanding them requires comprehension of both the international community and the unique features of the American position in the community. This article explains aspects of innovation and tradition in American foreign policy in terms of three topics. The article first surveys the unique features of American political development in terms of the influence on foreign policy. The discussion of the unique features of the American experience discusses America's unusual historical development as essentially anti-colonial and anti-imperial country. Second, the

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<sup>1</sup> "Имею желание купить дом, но не имею возможности. Имею возможность купить козу, но... не имею желания. Так выпьем за то, чтобы наши желания всегда совпадали с нашими возможностями!" Кавказская пленница. Мосфильм, 1967.

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article offers an interpretation of the American experience in terms of some leading strategic or “systems” perspectives. The discussion of America’s role in the global system emphasizes interpretations in strategic thinking regarding the different role of the US before and after the Second World War and through the end of the Cold War as the USSR came to an end. Finally, the article offers some suggestions for understanding the importance of American foreign policy for Uzbekistan in the current and rapidly evolving world order, influenced today more by emerging digital technologies than the industrial technologies which shaped the global strategic configuration for the past two centuries.

### **American Foreign Policy—Then, Today and Tomorrow**

The United States of America was legally and technically formed as a single state only in 1787, originally described in the US Constitution as the “united States of America”, with the term “united” being initially uncapitalized and used as an adjective rather than a part of the name of the country. The establishment of a centralized American government came eleven years after the states had broken away from British overrule. But even before the Declaration of Independence in 1776, the idea of an American political society distinct from its European legacy had emerged. Today, it is possible to think of the United States of America as having a history of a political community of roughly 250 years. Of the entire historical record, one way to understand American foreign policy is to regard it as having two distinctive phases. One phase was before 1941 and one phase came after 1945. There is continuity between these two phases, but the differences are more important.

In terms of the first phase, American political leaders from the first days in the life of the republic were regarded as breaking with well-established canons of political practice in Europe. The American republic, after all, was a country forged in the crucible of an anti-colonial revolution, breaking with ensconced patterns and practices that had long outlived their utility and rationale. America was the first great experiment in decolonization and the first great undertaking in creating wholly new forms of governance based upon the values and goals of visionary thinkers. America was born as a country of immigrants, populated by people who had left the Old World behind in order to escape severity, privation and subjection. Born as a people’s republic in a revolution against monarchical absolutism and the ensconced privileges of aristocracy, America was forged in the foundry of egalitarian individual rights and individual initiative. The new American republic had little interest in the con-

flicts and political travail of the Old World. As America's first Secretary of State, Thomas Jefferson, summed up America's purposes abroad, he said the purpose of this new country in foreign affairs was the pursuit of "peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none." [1].

One important aspect of the American experience is the consolidation and expansion of the American republic. American consolidation followed a path very unlike the paths of colonial expansion which were by European countries in other parts of the world. Endowed by ample natural resources and separated from other countries of the Old World by great oceans and great distances, America developed through the eighteenth, the nineteenth, and the first part of the twentieth century as a country very different from the colonial and post-colonial "Great Powers" of Europe and Asia. America tended to be in most respects what people regard as an "isolationist" power, concerned primarily with its own well-being rather than foreign relations. American foreign policy may have been proactive at time with its northern and southern neighbors, but it was primarily reactive with respect to other countries around the world. Even as America prospered as a country and its resources grew to be adequate to extend its influence beyond its borders, Americans were generally resistant to the ideas of empire and foreign influence. In the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries the great imperial powers of Europe had extended their influence and built their wealth on colonial expansion. America was an exception. In the early years, the American union was consumed basically with continental issues, linked first by waterways and later railroad construction that reached out to the west. America's first great expansion was the purchase from France in 1803 of the Louisiana territories for \$15 million. One of the first doctrinal statements of American foreign policy was the Monroe Doctrine. In Monroe's message to Congress, December 2, 1823, he stated two things, the first of which is remembered and the second of which is often forgotten or ignored. Monroe stated that American continents should not be considered subjects for future colonization by any European power. He also stated the US should not intervene in Europe.

**The most important change in American foreign policy is the shift from a reactive posture to a proactive posture that was produced by the Second World War. Before the war, American political instincts were essentially isolationist. After the war, America emerged as a different country, shouldering international responsibilities that it did not itself create but it could not ignore.**

At the time of Monroe's statement, Spain still claimed Mexico and much of the American west coast as a colonial possession. After Mexicans

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declared independence from Spain in 1821, competition broke out between the US and Mexico over Texas and California. The US recognized Texas in 1837 and Texas in 1845 joined the Union. In 1846 Congress settled the Oregon Treaty, dividing the Northwestern Territory with Britain along the 49<sup>th</sup> parallel, a straight line separating Canada from the US. The same year Congress declared war on Mexico over California and in 1848 the war came to an end with the US paying Mexico \$18M for California. The southern part of Arizona and New Mexico was purchased from Mexico in 1853 by the Gadsen purchase in which Mexico was paid \$10M for the territory. In 1859 Russia's Alexander II offered the sale of Alaska to the U.S., in part out of apprehensions that Britain might seek to capture the territories. The US civil war interrupted these discussions, but Russian diplomats recommenced in 1867 and the US met Russia's asking price of \$7.2M. In 1898 the US declared war on Spain over Cuba and destroyed the Spanish fleet at Manila. Defeated Spain ceded control over Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines to the US in exchange for \$20M. At the same time, the US annexed Hawaii after the Hawaiian government was overthrown in a rebellion. America also acquired Samoa as a result of an agreement with Germany. In 1901 the "Cuba Convention" made Cuba a US protectorate. Louisiana, California, Alaska, southern Arizona and New Mexico, Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam, and Philippines, in other words, the great bulk of America's expansion to the west, to the north, to the south was territory purchased, not captured in colonial conquest.

This is a sharp contrast with the European colonial empires. Spain and Portugal pioneered exploration and the territorial acquisition of colonies. They were followed by England, France, the Netherlands, Germany and Russia. Large parts of the globe were held in the hands of the colonial empires until the rise of competition. Those colonial empires were built on territorial occupation, annexation, domination and other ruses, but not by purchases.

Another sharp contrast with the experience of other countries is immediately apparent from the map alone. Surveying the outlines of the 50 states on the map, one sees a collection of borders, some of which are straight lines and some of which are complicated and uneven lines. As one looks closer at the uneven lines, it becomes clear that in all of America, the uneven lines are divisions defined by the course of rivers or lakes. Kentucky's uneven norther border, for instance, is defined by the course of the Ohio river. Indiana's uneven western border is defined by the Mississippi river. Washington's uneven southern border is defined by the Columbia river. One of the few uneven lines not defined by water is

Montana's border with Idaho, which is defined by a crest line. But this exception tends to prove the rule. Most borders in the US between the states are straight lines, created by compact. The difference between other countries around the world and the US is apparent by looking at a map. There are virtually no straight lines between countries in Europe where borders are the result of long-standing and frequently challenged agreements between territorial powers.



### **Border Contours of the 50 States of the USA**

Source: This map is in the public domain. See [https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Blank\\_US\\_map\\_borders.svg](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Blank_US_map_borders.svg)

The most important change in American foreign policy is the shift from a reactive posture to a proactive posture that was produced by the Second World War. Before the war, American political instincts were essentially isolationist. After the war, America emerged as a different country, shouldering international responsibilities that it did not itself create but it could not ignore. America played a key role in designing and



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financing the world's most important international institutions, including the UN, the World Bank, and numerous other international institutions. America exerted a leading role in shaping the post-War international order and helping to bring an end to the domination of the countries of Central Europe by the Soviet bloc. America by example set standards of policy and practice. America became one of the world's most ardent sponsors of international foreign assistance, foreign aid. America found a course in international affairs that had an almost magnetic attraction for other countries as a world leader in technology, and a model for many other countries of an efficient, popular, successful, self-governing, and democratic system.

The rivalry between the US and the closest competitor, the USSR, however, quickly split the world into two competing camps. Roosevelt's "Great Design" of four international policemen (America, England, Russia, and China) wavered briefly and then collapsed under the pressure of events. New international organizations came into being. The United Nations—less powerful than the League of Nations but more influential—was created. International organizations for standardizing policy and practice for world's economy were created. The unwillingness of the Soviet leadership to demobilize and withdraw troops from Eastern Europe and from Iran, Greece, and Turkey convinced the western world that new competition was both military and ideological; it was a competition of ideas as well as armies. Speaking in Fulton, Missouri in February 1946, at a graduation ceremony at Fulton College, Winston Churchill warned that "an Iron Curtain" had descended upon Europe.

The fall of the Czechoslovakian government to a communist faction and the refusal of the Soviet Union to demobilize its armies in the other East European regimes led to a renewed western resolve to contain and roll-back the influence of communism. Then came 1949; the "year of shocks." In April 1949, Soviet leaders closed western access to most of Berlin, precipitating the Berlin crisis. In response, Western governments airlifted 1.5 million tons of material supplies to the citizens of the western sector of Berlin in the "Berlin Airlift." In August 1949, the Federal Republic of Germany was officially established with the national capital situated in Bonn. But the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany did not recognize a division into two countries, East and West Germany. Many Germans anticipated the day when the country might be reunited.

In the atmosphere of Cold War confrontation, the United States began devising ways to deal with threats from the Soviet Union. These efforts gave the basic structure to American ideological, political, eco-

conomic, and foreign policies for the next half century. With the test of the first Soviet nuclear device in 1949, the Cold War escalated. Much of the political history of the period between 1949 and 1991 was structured by the Cold War competition. A leading historian of the Cold War, John Lewis Gaddis, spoke of the “geopolitical operational codes” which formed the doctrinal basis for America’s response to the Soviet Union’s policies. Gaddis cites a number of specific phases: 1) the Truman Doctrine and containment (1947-49); the “roll-back” period guided by the thinking of National Security Council Directive 68 (1950-53); the “New Look” (1953-61); the policy of “flexible response” (1961-69); and “detente” (early 1970s), the renewed Cold War (1979-1985), and perestroika (1986-1991) [2].

**Historically, major reshaping of the international community tended to come after major conflict. One thinks of the Peace of Westphalia, the Congress of Vienna, the Paris Peace, or the establishment of the post WW-II order. In these historical examples, the international community faced the challenge of making peace after war. But after the disintegration of communism, the peacemakers had a different challenge: the problem of securing peace in the midst of peace.**

Despite the Cold War, U.S.-Soviet cooperation continued in some spheres. The spirit of *detente* culminated with a conference in Helsinki, Finland, in 1975 called the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The Soviet Union participated in the conference seeking to gain diplomatic recognition of the borders of the East European countries, borders that were never officially recognized after the conclusion of the Second World War. The US diplomats sought international security, economic cooperation, and political liberalization. This last category, political liberalization, came to be known as “basket three” in negotiations because the issues were packaged together as an addendum to the more pressing security and economic issues. These provisions included respect for human rights, freedom of conscience, national identification, and the right to repatriation of divided families. The meeting concluded with the singing of the “Helsinki Final Act.” Human rights concerns eventually became the most significant enduring feature of the dialogue between East and West that continued under the auspices of CSCE follow-up conferences for twenty years until, in 1995, the conference participants formally reconstituted the organization as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

Soviet communism was based on the doctrine that a new proletarian experiment would sweep the entire world and would become the ruling form of government and then replace traditional forms of government by eliminating government entirely. The Soviet system evolved in a very

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different way, however. In the early years the idea of world communism was replaced by the idea of “socialism in one country” and eventually the Soviet system developed into a nuclear superpower rivaling the US and western countries in one sphere—military capacity.

The Soviet model proved to be too brittle for evolution and too resistant to internal change. Gradually the inflexibility of the system brought it to denouement. The international community after

the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 became much more complex than that of fifty years before. Historically, major reshaping of the international community tended to come after major conflict. One thinks of the Peace of Westphalia, the Congress or Vienna, the Paris Peace, or the establishment of the post WW-II order. In these historical examples, the international community faced the challenge of making peace after war. But after the disintegration of communism, the peacemakers had a different challenge: the problem of securing peace in the midst of peace.

The military arena of competition was underscored by a political and ideological competition defined by values and goals but also by associations and alliances that defined “East” and “West”. The military and political arenas of competition were further underscored by an economic competition over models of production, commerce, trade and development. As the USSR came to an end, much of the attractiveness of the socialist model was abandoned and the momentum of the Cold War period was picked up by the countries favoring the Western model, led, to a large extent, by the direction charted by the United States. In the twilight of the receding Soviet superpower, expectations grew that America would follow the Cold War with a period of accelerating preeminence, establishing a “unipolar” world order with America exerting hegemonic control on a global level. But the expectations of a rapid rise of American global dominance were greatly exaggerated. American foreign policy in the wake of the Soviet denouement were essentially oriented toward continuity and incremental change rather than transformation. As the Clinton administration came into office in early 1993, the policies it pursued only incrementally reduced the military arena, while the efforts in political and economic arenas put greater emphasis on practices and institutions conforming to the Western model of the “Washington consensus.” [3].

When the Bush administration came into office in early 2001 the initial focus was on enhancing America's military, political and economic arenas through greater effectiveness, but the Bush administration was soon pressed to meet a wholly unanticipated challenge by the attacks targeted on the US by terrorists. The idea the military must be prepared to face a "big war" was pushed aside and many analysts recalculated on the threats posed by terrorists, insurgents and by small local wars. The events of September 11, 2001 changed the script for the foreign policy of the Bush administration. The Global War on Terrorism essentially represented a shift from defense to offense. Rather than crouching in a defensive huddle, the Bush administration elected to take the fight to the enemy. Offensive actions, of any kind, are generally more expensive than defensive operations. But a well-defined and well-executed offense can also be the best defense. To a large extent the global war on terror achieved the defensive goal for the United States. Other attacks on the United States on the scale of the Bin Laden attack were apparently plotted, but none succeeded. However, at the same time the actions of the global war on terror did not succeed in transforming the economic and political terrain in the countries where the terrorist networks were based.

The Obama administration came into office in January 2009 with a set of seemingly intractable economic problems from a wrenching financial crisis. Obama administration officials had campaigned on criticism of American foreign military engagements. Adopting a series of cautious conflict-averse steps in foreign policy soon gained critics who saw Obama's policies as constituting retrenchment. But America was dealing with the costs of adjustment from the changes that globalization and the dominating role of global trade had thrust on America. Much of America's heavy industry had shifted abroad during the previous two decades. Free trade policies made it possible for American investors to seek dividends from investment in manufacturing and production in other countries. This aspect of globalization worked well for the investors. But the enthusiasm of free markets which buoyed Wall Street consistently played against the interests of Main Street. In past generations, American heavy industry had made America an industrial juggernaut. But now the jobs of heavy industry had vanished abroad, leaving a new generation of American workers questioning many of the principles of global economic liberalism.

As the Trump administration came into office in early 2017 the focus immediately was fixed on reversing many of the trends of the previous three decades, rebuilding the economic factors that had made America the leading industrial country of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, restoring the levels of employment, social stability and political satisfaction which had become

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so characteristic of the United States. The Trump administration sought to reestablish America's role abroad as a country which needed to be respected even if not feared. The Trump administration began pursuing an extremely active diplomatic agenda but not an extended agenda. Administration officials were looking for leverage more than engagement. Addressing top executives of the world's largest energy companies and oil ministers in Houston, Pompeo said in prepared remarks that America's newfound shale oil and natural gas abundance would "strengthen our hand in foreign policy." [4]. But with respect to many principled issues the administration was forthright and blunt. As regards the Ukrainian problem, Secretary Pompeo plainly and unambiguously stated, "The United States reiterates its unwavering position: Crimea is Ukraine and must be returned to Ukraine's control." [5]. As regards Cuban prevarication, Secretary Pompeo lambasted the "national referendum" on revisions to the constitution. Pompeo stated, "No one should be fooled by this exercise, which achieves little beyond perpetuating the pretext for the regime's one-party dictatorship. The entire process has been marked by carefully managed political theater and repression of public debate." [6].

America's recent foreign policy posture during the Trump administration has come as a surprise to some who expected that surprises from American foreign policy would come as incremental changes of course, pursuing minor adjustments in functioning rather than systematic transformation. These expectations were based on the fact that in recent years the Republican party was regarded as the conservative party and the Democratic party was regarded as the liberal party. Conservatives have traditionally been viewed as cautious, status-quo defenders and liberals have been viewed as activist promoters of change. But the administration of Donald Trump has fundamentally changed the way that people think of American government and American foreign policy. This invites us to reassess our approach to both policy and practice.

### **Strategic Theory and World Order**

Conventional approaches to explaining the behavior and predicting the future steps of major actors tend to be rooted in international relations strategic theories. Conventional theories fall into three schools; realism, liberalism and Marxism. These theories are typically represented as systems of ideas, but in reality, they are deeply rooted in the socio-economic conditions of the industrial revolution. It is important to bear in mind that the impact of the current information revolution is now surpassing the legacy of the industrial revolution.

Realism is a way of thinking which has its origins in ancient thinkers such as Thucydides and Sun-Tsu. But realism in its modern form is very much a product of the legal definitions of the Grotian system married to the realities of the industrial revolution and the rise of the modern state. For the realists the state is the primary actor in the system. The state pursues its interests and seeks to enhance either security or influence or power [7]. Realists think of the contemporary international system as a field of competing units of various sizes and capabilities, struggling by means of strategies of self-advancement to achieve goals that are sometimes common, sometimes contradictory. Large and resourceful states can achieve their goals through partnership, influence, alliance, demand, and coercion. Small and less resourceful states find the strategies at their disposal more constrained. Hence small states are encouraged by realist doctrine to pursue strategies of aggregation, coalition-formation and integration.

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Other schools of strategic thought put more emphasis on the importance of collective goals and international cooperation driving factors in defining the contemporary international systems. Neoliberalism is the idea that the state is a constellation of interests acting within a field of cooperation and avoidance, seeking gains or avoiding losses [8]. Neo-liberals regard the nation-state as the primary actor and primary platform, but generally endorse greater roles for international organizations, multilateral institutions and international law. However, it is important that liberals and neo-liberals do not question the components of the systems or the legitimacy of the actors in general. The international state system is itself not questioned, but the way it works in the pursuit of peace and prosperity is the focus of liberal attention.

Realism and liberalism, in all the brands and versions, are counterposed by Marxism. Marx was an amateur anthropologist, a sociologically-oriented political economist, and an activist ideologist. Marx's ideas are basically rooted in the social and political milieu of the most concentrated period of the industrial revolution. Marx's theories drove him toward simple explanations of social conflict. Marx thought that history proceeded in stages and earlier hunter-gatherer, agricultural, and trading societies had been built on scavenging, plunder, predatory trading with foreigners, or feudal exactions. Marx thought the capitalism of the industrial world

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was different in the sense that it built prosperity on new industrial production, bringing new value into the world. The goal of the proletarian revolution, Marx reasoned, would be to appropriate this value for the good of the workers. Marx's views on exploitation brought him to a particularly strident interpretation of the nature of the international system in the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century. He saw the governments of Western Europe as nothing more than executive committees of the rich propped up by the symbols and slogans of nationalism to rationalize the distribution of property in the interests of the wealthy. Government, Marx argued, was an integument that the wealthy created to protect itself from the un-landed and un-propertied masses. Marx believed that his theories were as much a prescription as a diagnosis. The philosophers of the past, he said, «have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is, however, to change it.» [9]

Strategic thinkers whether from the realist, liberal and Marxian or other perspectives, see the recent period of history in American foreign policy as hard to explain. Asserting that America's ends exceeded its means, some scholars concluded that America reached a period of "imperial overreach", as did Paul Kennedy argued in his book *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* [10]. Such is the thesis argued by Andrew Bacevich in his *The Limits of Power* [11]. Some analysts see the changes that are taking place in terms of socioeconomic processes, not necessarily the foreign policies of any particular states. Contemplating the end of the bipolar configuration, Francis Fukuyama argued the most important ideological conflicts would come to an end as democracy, market-oriented politics, and international standards of policy and practice grew to be universally accepted [12]. Other analysts anticipated different changes, calling attention to the emergence of cultural conflicts in terms of a "clash of civilizations" as Samuel Huntington argued in 1993 in the pages of one of the most influential journals, *Foreign Affairs*, claiming "The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future." [13].

Some scholars maintained that the structure of the international system is what determines state behavior. If the global order changes, state behavior changes accordingly. John Mearsheimer argued that as the Cold War came to an end many policy makers and academics anticipated a new era of peace and prosperity, an era in which democracy and open trade would herald the «end of history.» According to Mearsheimer, great power politics are always tragic because the anarchy of the international system requires states to seek dominance at one another's expense, dooming even peaceful nations to a relentless power struggle. Mearsheim-

er surveys modern great power struggles and reflects on the bleak prospects for peace in Europe and northeast Asia, arguing that US security competition with a rising China can be expected to intensify [14].

Some scholars have drawn attention to the changing role of America in the modern international community, asserting that America is not in decline but that “everyone else is rising” as Fareed Zakaria argued in his *The Post-American World* [15]. Some observers see a world in which the principal competition is among nation-states pursuing their traditional goals but in a non-traditional context; a context in which, as Robert Kagan has expressed it, “we have entered an age of divergence” [16]. Some scholar have maintained that the global system is deeper, broader and more equilibrating than it appears. Hal Brands argued, “the United States’ post-Cold War grand strategy has not marked a radical departure from the country’s previous statecraft; it has not been a catastrophic failure, and it has not been irrevocably overtaken by global power shifts. Rather, the United States’ post-Cold War approach has been rooted firmly in its successful post-war strategic tradition, and it has been broadly effective in molding the international system to Washington’s liking [17].

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The outcome of the US presidential election in 2016 was unexpected by many foreign observers of American policy. The first two years of Donald Trump’s administration underscored several values and objectives that have long been held by substantial groups in the US but, at the same time, charted a direction which seemed to undercut many of the fundamental principles and institutions of foreign relations in previous years. The withdraw from many multilateral trade agreements, the criticism of trade partners as well as alliance partners, the withdrawal from former commitments with respect to treaties designed to contain the proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons technology, the abandonment of popular climate control initiatives, made it abundantly clear that US foreign policy had entered a new phase which is not simply a continuation of the past. As Kori Schake, of London’s International Institute for Strategic Studies, pointed out recently, “President Donald Trump’s sharp-elbowed nationalism, opposition to multilateralism and international institutions, and desire to shift costs onto US allies reflect the American public’s understandable weariness with acting as the global order’s defender and custodian.” [18]. Schake explained that American voters no longer saw the benefit in financially shoring up international



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institutions that seemed to serve their own institutional purposes rather than national purposes or even commercial purposes.

How do we explain these recent changes in the global order? In the brief introduction to his book *World Order*, Henry Kissinger offered a succinct analysis of differing values, assumptions and proclivities as they affect international security in contemporary circumstances. Kissinger argued that, despite the fact that we frequently speak about the “international community” and make references to the idea of a “world order”, in fact “no truly global world order has ever existed” [19]. “What passes for order in our time, “ Kissinger argued, “was devised in Western Europe nearly four centuries ago, at a peace conference in the German region of Westphalia, conducted without the involvement or even the awareness of most other continents or civilizations.” Kissinger explained, “The Westphalian peace reflected a practical accommodation to reality, not a unique moral insight. It relied on a system of independent states refraining from interference in each other’s domestic affairs and checking each other’s ambitions through a general equilibrium of power.”[20].

The Westphalian system endured to this day, to be sure with many flaws, to become the foundation for the assumptions of the international system exemplified by the UN and other institutions of global governance. These institutions re-emerged after WWII in a more robust form to shape the present basic global security architecture. But that architecture, Kissinger argued, was not shared with the same Westphalian assumptions and principles by everyone. Kissinger reflected that “At the opposite end of the Eurasian landmass from Europe, China was the center of its own hierarchical and theoretically universal concept of order. This system had operated for millennia—it had been in place when the Roman Empire governed Europe as a unity—basing itself not on the sovereign equality of states but on the presumed boundlessness of the Emperor’s reach. In this concept, sovereignty in the European sense did not exist, because the Emperor held sway over ‘All under Heaven’.” [21]. Kissinger stressed, “In much of the region between Europe and China, Islam’s different universal concept of world order held sway, with its own vision of a single divinely sanctioned governance uniting and pacifying the world.” Finally, Kissinger pointed to the emergence of a distinct version of world order that evolved out of the “New World” in the 17th century in which “the American vision rested not on an embrace of the European balance-of-power system but on the achievement of peace through the spread of democratic principles.”[22]. Today many people in professional diplomatic circles openly wonder whether the field of diplomacy has not witnessed a “take-off” point at which a qualitative change has occurred and

many of the time-honored and established principles of the Westphalian world order are outdated.

We often forget that the economic and political categories we use are associated with technological stages. For instance, Marxism is often regarded as an ideological world view that defines how people behave in economic and political respects. But there is a strong argument that what Marx's theories describe is less an ideological consequence than a result of the industrial revolution that established the conditions for a vast "proletarian" working class in contradistinction to an enfranchised property-owning class. Marxism is a product of the industrial revolution. Without the industrial revolution, there could be no Marxist revolution. There is a new technological revolution now—the information revolution. The information revolution is in the process now of reshaping societies in a way that is creating entirely new social, economic and consequently political relations. New ways to strategically understand foreign policy will need to take these technological developments into account.

### **American Foreign Policy and Uzbekistan**

The days of the territorially-based politics of the 19<sup>th</sup> century are over even if some of the habits of the world of imperial contests tend to persist. The historical role of the US is important in this context. The US is not an Empire; it is not a colonial power; and it is not an expansionist system. The US regards sovereign countries as being entitled to territorial integrity, the right to non-interference in domestic affairs, and the right to determine their own policies, associations, alliances and definitions of national interest. The US does not support the idea of "special spheres of influence" which relegate some countries to "second class sovereignty." Historically the record is clear. The US does not support the concept of spheres of influence; it never has and it is not likely that it ever will.

This is a period of great opportunity for cooperative foreign policies. Two things are important. One is having robust forms of interaction that can build mutual understanding. The knowledge of Uzbekistan in the American political community was severely circumscribed during the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The work of great practitioners and scholars such as Eugene Schuler [23], Geoffrey Wheeler [24], Alexander Bennigsen, Edward Allworth, Shirin Akiner and others led a dynamic generation of American scholars such as Nancy Lubin and Martha Brill Olcott. The indefatigable work of S. Frederick Starr provided insight into the roots of Central Asia policy [25] and continues to play a critical role in future policy [26]. Marlene Laruelle and others have helped to build an in-

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formed and talented cadre of specialists from the new generation [27]. The search for cooperative strategy is to a large extent founded in mutual understanding. The better we can enhance our insight into the goals and resources of partners, the more likely we can promote further cooperation.

## Literature

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1. Citing Thomas Jefferson's injunction against "entangling alliances", David Fromkin in a famous article published in the journal *Foreign Affairs* in 1970, noted, "From 1789 until the Second World War, excepting only our relationship with Panama, the United States refused to enter into treaties of alliance with anyone. In the 25 years since the end of the war, however, in a dramatic reversal of national policy, we have allied ourselves with half the world." David Fromkin, "Entangling Alliances." *Foreign Affairs*. Vol. 48, No. 4 (July 1970): pp. 688-698. (Source: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1970-07-01/entangling-alliances>) Michael Beckley, "The Myth of Entangling Alliances: Reassessing the Security Risks of U.S. Defense Pacts." *International Security*. Vol. 39, No. 4 (Spring 2015): pp. 7-48. Also see Adam Taylor. "Map: The U.S. is bound by treaties to defend a quarter of humanity." *The Washington Post*. May 30, 2015.

(Source: [https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/05/30/map-the-u-s-is-bound-by-treaties-to-defend-a-quarter-of-humanity/?utm\\_term=.8a0bbc781574](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/05/30/map-the-u-s-is-bound-by-treaties-to-defend-a-quarter-of-humanity/?utm_term=.8a0bbc781574))

2. *John Lewis Gaddis*. *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy*. Oxford University Press. 2005.

3. "Washington consensus" was a term coined by the economist John Williamson to refer to the policy matrix promoted by leading international organizations during the 1980s and 1990s. See John Williamson, editor. *The Political Economy of Policy Reform*. Washington: Institute for International Economics. 1994.

4. Collin Eaton and Lesley Wroughton. "Pompeo calls on oil industry to support U.S. foreign policy agenda." Reuters. March 13, 2019. (Source: <https://www.reuters.com/article/ceraweek-energy-pompeo-speech/ceraweek-pompeo-calls-on-oil-industry-to-support-us-foreign-policy-agenda-idUSL1N20Z1YZ>)

5. *Michael R. Pompeo*. "Crimea Is Ukraine." U.S. Department of State Press Statement (February 27, 2019) (Source: <https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2019/02/289749.htm>)

6. *Michael R. Pompeo*. "Cuba's So-Called Referendum." U.S. State Department Press Statement. (February 26, 2019) (Source: <https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2019/02/289708.htm>)

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8. There are many variations on liberalism and neo-liberalism. See for a classic exposition, see *Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye*. *Power and Interdependent: World Politics in Transition*. Little, Brown. 1977.

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19. *Henry Kissinger*. World Order. Penguin Press. 2014. p, 2.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 6
23. *Eugene Schuyler*. Turkistan, Notes of a Journey in Russian Turkistan, Kokand, Bukhara and Kuldja. Editor. Geoffrey Wheeler. Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1966.
24. *Geoffrey Wheeler*. The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia. Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 1964.
25. *S. Frederick Starr*. Lost Enlightenment: Central Asia's Golden Age from the Arab Conquest to Tamerlane. Princeton University Press. 2013.
26. *S. Frederick Starr and Svante E. Cornell*. Uzbekistan's New Face. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 2018.
27. *Marlene LaRuelle*. "New Generations in Central Asia: Opportunities and Challenges of Transformation." Lecture at the Harriman Institute of Columbia University. February 11, 2019. <https://harriman.columbia.edu/event/new-generations-central-asia-opportunities-and-challenges-transformation>